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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we presented a new key exchange method based on decomposition problem for elliptic curve cryptography. 
We showed that our key exchange method was not only an alternative method for designing keys in cryptography, but 
it also has improved security condition from the previous key exchange based on decomposition problem over non-
commutative groups. We proposed elliptic an curve cryptography to be the new platform for our key exchange protocol 
and showed how it was implemented. The security of our protocol was based on discrete logarithm problem, which was 
not infeasible and strictly difficult to retrieve in elliptic curve cryptography without any prior knowledge.
Keywords: Discrete logarithm problem; elliptic curve cryptography; key exchange using decomposition problem; non-
commutative groups
ABSTRAK
Kertas ini  membentangkan satu  kaedah pertukaran kekunci baru  berdasarkan masalah pelupusan untuk lengkungan 
eliptik kriptografi. Kaedah pertukaran ini bukan sahaja suatu kaedah alternatif bagi mereka cipta kekunci dalam 
kriptografi, tetapi ia juga menambah baik lagi sistem keselamatan berbanding kaedah pertukaran kekunci berdasarkan 
masalah pelupusan tak kalis tukar tertib yang terdahulu. Lengkungan kriptografi eliptik akan digunakan sebagai platform 
utama dalam kaedah pertukaran kekunci berdasarkan masalah pelupusan tak kalis tukar tertib dan bagaimana kaedah 
aplikasinya akan ditunjukkan. Keselamatan bagi protokol baru ini adalah berdasarkan penyelesaian masalah diskrit 
logarithma dalam lengkungan eliptik kriptografi, dan kaedah ini adalah tak tersaur dan sukar untuk diselesaikan tanpa 
syarat-syarat tertentu.
Kata kunci: Kumpulan tak kalis tukar tertib; lengkungan elliptik kriptografi; masalah diskrit logaritma; pertukaran 
kekunci bagi masalah perlupusan
INTRODUCTION
Our aim in this paper was to study the mathematics of 
key exchange using decomposition problem in elliptic 
curve. Decomposition problem is a method introduced by 
Shpilrain and Ushakov (2005). It is a method of arranging 
certain parameters in a subgroup, depending on the 
particular group of , which needs to be a non-commutative 
group and denoted by centralizer . We extend the idea of 
key exchange using decomposition problem to elliptic 
curve cryptography that improved the security of key 
establishment protocol. We showed that the protocol is 
more secured and easier to compute than the previous 
protocol of key exchange over non- commutative group. 
The main idea was based on cyclic group and the discrete 
logarithm problem that relies in elliptic curve.
 In the first section of this paper, we introduced 
the algebraic structure regarding the computations 
that are related to the protocols. Next we discuss on 
the mathematical background, which is needed in the 
construction of protocol. After a brief explanation on 
decomposition problem in non-commutative groups by 
Shpilrain and Ushakov (2005), we proposed an alternative 
method of key exchange based on decomposition problem 
using elliptic curve cryptography. Then we presented an 
analysis of computing the discrete logarithm problem. We 
also showed ways of choosing parameter in elliptic curve, 
which need to be considered to ensure the smoothness form 
for cryptography. At the end of this paper, we discuss some 
implementation issues and the advantages of using elliptic 
curve as the main platform.
ALGEBRAIC STRUCTURE IN ELLIPTIC CURVE 
CRYPTOGRAPHY
To determine the numbers of points we need to satisfy 
certain combination of operations called algebraic structure 
which is known as groups (Forouzan 2008). For elliptic 
curve, the group () is set of elements with binary operation 
+, that satisfies four properties (axioms). A commutative 
group, also known as an abelian group, satisfies four 
properties in groups plus property in commutativity.  The 
properties are defined as follows:
908
Consider an elliptic curve  with points P = (xp, yp), Q = (xQ, 
yQ) and R= (xR, yR).
1. Closure:
 If P and Q are elements of G, then R = P + Q is also 
 an element of G.
2. Associativity:
 If P, Q and R are elements of G, then (P + Q) + R = 
 P + (Q + R).
3. Commutativity:
 For all P and Q in G, then P + Q = Q + P.
4. Existence of inverse:
 For each P in G, there exist an element P*, called the 
 inverse of P, such that P + P* = P* + P = e.  
5. Existence of identity:
 For all P in G, there exist an element e, called the 
 identity element, such that e + P = P + e = P. 
 Cyclic group in elliptic curve  is a group that has their 
own cyclic subgroup. Let say, we have a group  which is 
a cyclic group, and the elements that generates in cyclic 
subgroup can also generate the group itself. We refer it 
as a generator. If g is a generator, the elements in a finite 
cyclic group can be written as:
{e, g, g2, …, gn–1} where gn = e.
 Note that a cyclic group can have many generators. 
And the finite field is a field with finite number of elements, 
also known as Galois fields and denoted by GF(q).  
MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND IN ELLIPTIC  
CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY
The mathematical computation on elliptic curve 
cryptography requires an abelian group constructed 
from elliptic curve over finite fields. From the paper by 
Závadský and Horňanová (2008), they defined the finite 
field  in elliptic curve as a set of  and two operations 
(+) and (.) which is:
1.  is an additive group concerning to operation (+) 
2. \{0} is a multiplicative group concerning to 
 operation (·) 
3. For all a, b, c ∈  holds
a · (b + c) = (a · b) + (a · c) and 
(a + b) · c = (a · c) + (b · c). 
 There are two type of finite fields involve in elliptic 
curve cryptography which are:
1. Elliptic curve over a field q = {0, 1, …, q – 1} 
2. Elliptic curve over a field 2m = {0, 1, …, 2m – 1} of 
 characterization 2
 The points on elliptic curve, E of the form y2 = x3 + 
ax + b where a, b ∈  will be defined as over galois field 
GF(q) with characteristic q larger than 3 and 4a3 + 27b ≠ 
0. For all points (x, y) on E, there will be a point x ∈ q, 
y ∈ q and point at infinity. It can be summarized as 
below:
 Elliptic curve, E : y2 ≡ x3 + ax + b (mod q), and defined 
 as the finite field with q > 3 
E(q) = {(x,y) ∈ q2 ; y2 = x3 + ax + b} ∪ {∞},
where a, b ∈ q and Δ = 4a3 + 27b = 0. Δ is called 
discrimant of elliptic curve, and the condition that Δ ≠ 0 
ensure that the curve is smooth or, there are no points at 
which the curve has more than one distinct tangent lines. 
The point at infinity denoted by ∞, also said to be one of 
the set of all points on E serving as identity element in 
the operations.
DECOMPOSITION PROBLEM
Decomposition problem is a method of computing public 
key exchange, introduced by Shpilrain and Ushakov 
(2005). It is an arrangement of different keys in certain 
subgroup. Specific ways to construct the sequences 
depend on the particular group of G, which is G has to 
be non-commutative, and the group of G denote by the 
centralizer of g ∈ G. Centralizer is used to compute 
the sufficient element in group G. They introduced this 
protocol to improve the security of key establishment on 
decomposition problem. To prevent any possible attacks 
on the protocol, they also include some requirements in 
the choosing of group G.
 As an alternative method, we proposed elliptic 
curve cryptography to be the new platform for this key 
agreement. We used a class of group constructed using 
points on an elliptic curve. This set of points form a 
commutative group under a group operation as required in 
elliptic curve cryptography. This differs from the method 
in Shpilrain and Ushakov (2005) in which the security of 
the protocol depends on a particular platform group G, in 
which, G at the very least has to be non-commutative to 
avoid the so-called length attacks which present a serious 
threat.
 The elements of the previous protocol will be replaced 
as points on the curve, and each of the points must satisfy 
the algebraic structure in elliptic curve. From the previous 
protocol, the adversary needs to compute the centralizer 
which is usually hard, before arranging the length attack to 
the protocol.  Compare to the protocol for elliptic curve, the 
adversary needs to solve the discrete logarithm problem, 
which is needed to obtain the number of points on the 
curve, r or s.  It is computationally not feasible to obtain, 
if r or s is large enough.
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KEY AGREEMENT BASED ON DECOMPOSITION  
PROBLEM FOR ELLIPTIC CURVE
Consider the domain parameters in this protocol defined 
by elliptic curve, E over the finite field, q with order 
n. Assume that there are two users involved in this key 
agreement; Alice and Bob, have no prior contact and the 
only communication channel between them is public. They 
both agreed on a same public point Q ∈ [1, n – 1] on the 
curve E, and the different cofactor for each users: r and s 
where  r or s = #E(q)/n. #E(q) is the number of points on 
an elliptic curve. This is the following sequence of steps:
Protocol:-
1. Alice chooses a private point a1 ∈ E(q) takes #E(q) 
= r, and a generator of E(q) is a1 = (xa1, ya1). Alice 
gathers the points to be A = {a1, a2, …, ar–1} and 
publishes it.
2. Bob chooses a private point b2 ∈ E(q), takes #E(q) = 
s, and a generator of E(q) is b2 = (xb2, yb2). Bob gathers 
the points to be B = {b1, b2, …, bs–1} and publishes 
it.
3. Alice gets < b1, b2, …, bs–1 > from the public channel, 
and she picks another point as her private and defines 
it as a2. Then she multiplies it with private key a1 and 
public point Q to obtain PA = a1Qa2, then sends it to 
Bob.
4. Similarly, Bob gets < a1, a2, …, ar–1 > from the public 
channel, picks a point to be his other private and 
defines it as b1. Then he multiplies it with his private 
key b2 and public point Q to obtain PB = b1Qb2, then 
sends it to Alice.
5. Alice multiplies the PB from Bob with her private key 
a1, a2 and defines it as KA = a1PBa2. 
6. Bob multiplies the PA  from Alice with his private key 
b1, b2 and defines it as KB = b1PAb2. 
Since the curve E(q) is cyclic, so that we will have a1a2 
= a2a1 and b1b2 = b2b1 and from here it shows that KA = 
KB = K. They will have the same shared key using this 
decomposition problem in E.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security of the proposed protocol is based on the 
difficulty of computing elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem and the decomposition problem scheme.
 We present the confidentiality of the private key in this 
protocol. Let say an eavesdropper want to obtain a1, a2 ∈ 
PA and b1, b2 ∈ PB from all the public information that he 
can retrieve from the public channel. But the difficulty is 
equivalent to solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem (ECDLP).
ECDLP: From elliptic curve E defined over a finite field q, 
a point a1 ∈ E(q) of order n and a point a1 ∈ < A >, find 
the integer r ∈ [1, n – 1] such that a1 ∈ ra1. The integer 
r is called discrete logarithm problem of a1 to base a1 
denoted by r = loga1a1.
 The computation of the discrete logarithm problem in 
this protocol should be infeasible or strictly hard to retrieve 
in E(q).
 Our protocol also depends on which elliptic curve 
platform we need to take since there will be several ways to 
choose the parameter A and B for elliptic curve defined by 
E : y2 = x3 + Ax + B and must satisfy 4A3 + 27B2 ≠ 0. This 
condition helps to make sure the curve is smooth (i.e.: with 
no cusps). And it is known as discriminant, it could not 
be zero for elliptic E(q) to possess three distinct roots. If 
the discriminant is zero, that would imply for two or more 
roots to coalesce, giving the curve a cusp or some other 
form of non-smoothness. Non-smooth curves are singular, 
and it is not safe to use singular curve for cryptography.
 The number of points on E denoted by # E(q). Since 
of integers mod  are quadratic residues, the number of 
points will be roughly q+1, counting the point to infinity. 
Hasse’s theorem states that the number of points on an 
elliptic curve (including the point at infinity) is:
#E(q) = q + 1 – t     with q is prime where |t | < 2√q.
 If the value for t2 = 0, q, 2q, 3q or 4q,  then the curve 
E is said to be non-supersingular.  Thus, the advantages 
of choosing curve as non-supersingular helps to prevent 
from the Menezes, Okamoto, and Vanstone (MOV) attack 
(Koblitz et al. 2000).
 However, the security of Shilprain and Ushakov 
(2005) is only based on the assumption that given public 
elements w, Pa, Pb it is hard to distinguish the shared key 
K from a random element of the form awb.  In order to 
make the protocol secure, they need to choose a large 
number for the centralizer CG(g) which G is a group and 
g ∈ G. Furthermore, they need to choose the platform for 
group G that satisfy certain properties such as G has to be a 
non-commutative group. Since public key cryptography is 
also called asymmetric cryptography, meaning encryption 
with a public key is easy and decryption without the correct 
private key is hard. The same concept applies to our key 
exchange protocol in elliptic curve cryptography; where 
given the public points PA, PB and Q, it is hard to determine 
the shared key K from the combination of private keys and 
public key. This shows that the security of the protocol 
by Shilprain and Ushakov (2005) also applies to our 
protocol.
 The difference between our protocol and Shilprain and 
Ushakov (2005) is that ours is applied on a new different 
platform which is on elliptic curve cryptography.  Thus, 
our protocol is more secured since it is based not only on 
the difficulty of the decomposition problem scheme, but 
also on the computational infeasibility maintained by the 
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and the security 
provided by elliptic curve cryptography.
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IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES FOR DECOMPOSITION 
PROBLEM IN ELLIPTIC CURVE
The implementation of the group operation in decomposition 
problem should be easy to apply, but still keeps the inverse 
of the calculation hard to compute.  This is the reason 
why we are using elliptic curve as the main platform in 
this protocol. Our new key exchange in elliptic curve 
cryptography based on decomposition problem observes 
as an alternative to the previous key exchange in Elliptic 
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH).
 Based on the idea by Koblitz et al. (2000), the 
efficiency of this protocol can be compared by the times 
to compute:
1. Point PA = a1Qa2 where a1, a2 ∈ E(q) and q = qm, where 
q is a prime and m ≈ 160, Q is a random public point 
with 160-bit integer. The computation of PA repeated 
doubling and adding to the average and requires 
320 elliptic curve doubling and 160 elliptic curve 
additions.
 It should be known that E must be non-supersingular, 
so that it is suitable to use elliptic curve in cryptography. 
The advantages of using elliptic curve are with the 
implementation of a smaller group in elliptic curve 
systems, helps to low-cost and low-power implementation 
in computing environments such as smart cards (Agnew 
et al. 1993), and the underlying of field E(q) and a 
representation for its elements can be selected so that the 
field arithmetic (addition, multiplication, inversion) can 
be optimized.
CONCLUSION
Key exchange in elliptic curve cryptography using 
decomposition problem can be considered as an alternative 
method from the previous protocols such as Elliptic 
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) (Forouzan 2008) and key 
exchange based on decomposition problem over non-
commutative groups (Shpilrain & Ushakov 2005). The 
security of our scheme relies on computing the discrete 
logarithm problem.  This key agreement also considers 
the parameters that are commonly used in elliptic curve. 
Compare to the previous protocols, our protocol seems to 
work better and is more secured because points will be 
the elements for the computation. For future works, we 
would like to do an implementation of our key exchange 
based on decomposition problem with the encryption 
method in elliptic curve cryptography. We will focus on 
effort to establish a stronger confidence in the system 
that determines concrete computer design for practical 
purposes. We hope to give results on practical values in 
the future.
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